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The "Problem" of Automation:
Inappropriate Feedback and Interaction, Not "Overautomation"
DONALD A. NORMAN
As automation increasingly takes its place in industry, especially high-risk industry, it is often blamed for
causing harm and increasing the chance of human error when failures occur.-! propose_hat the problem is
not the presence of automation, but rather its inappropriate design. The problem is that the operations are
performed appropriately under normal conditions, but there is inadequate feedback and interaction with the
humans who must control the overall conduct of the task. When the situations exceed the capabilities of the
automatic equipment, then the inadequate feedback leads to difficulties for the human controllers.
The problem, I suggest, is that the automation is at an intermediate level of intelligence, powerfuI enough
to take over control that which used to be done by people, but not powerful enough to handle aIl abnormalities.
Moreover, its level of intelligence is insufficient to provide the continual, appropriate feedback that occurs
naturally among human operators. This is the source of current difficulties. To solve this problem, the
automation should either be made less intelligent or more so, but the current level is quite inappropriate.
The overall message is that it is possible to reduce error through appropriate design considerations.
Appropriate design should assume the existence of error, it should continually provide feedback, it should
continually interact with operators in an effective manner, and it should allow for the worst of situations.
What is needed is a soft, compliant technology, not a rigid, formal one.
Although automation is often identified as a
major culprit in industrial accidents, I pro-
pose that the problems result from inappropri-
ate application, not the commonly blamed cul-
prit of "overautomation." According to this
view, operations would be improved either
with a more appropriate form of automation or
by removing some existing automation. Cur-
rent automatic systems have an intermediate
level of intelligence that tends to maximize
difficulties.
This leads to a second point, namely, that in
design, it is essential to examine the entire
system: the equipment, the crew, the social
structure, learning and training, cooperative
activity, and the overall goals of the task. Analy-
ses and remedies that look at isolated segments
are apt to lead to local, isolated improvements,
but they may also create new problems and
difficulties at the system level. Too often, the
implementation of some new "improved" auto-
matic system, warning signal, retraining, or
procedure is really a sign of poor overall de-
sign: Had the proper system level analysis been
performed, quite a different solution might have
resulted.
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Automation: Simultaneously Too
Much and Too Little
Consider the task of the crew on a modern
commercial airplane. Most of the flight activity
is routine. Large, modem aircraft are relatively
easy to fly: The airplane is stable, responsive,
and maneuverable. The automatic equipment
monitors all operations and helps ease the
workload of the crew. Indeed, whereas the
commercial airplane of a few years ago re-
quired a crew of three, the newer planes need
only two people to fly them, and most of the
time, only one is really necessary. Most of this is
good, and the accident rate with modem air-
craft has been decreasing over the years, the
decrease highly correlated with (and usually
thought to be a result of) the introduction of
high-technology controls and automation.
There are problems, however. For one, the
sheer size of the plane means that the crew
cannot know all that is happening. They are
physically isolated from the passengers and
any difficulties that may be occurring within
the passenger section of the plane. They are
isolated from most of the physical structures of
the aircraft. Even more important than physical
isolation is the mental isolation caused by the
nature of the controls. The automatic equip-
ment monitors and controls the aircraft, pro-
riding little or no trace of its operations to the
crew, isolating them from the moment-to-
moment activities of the aircraft and of the
controls. On the one hand, this combination of
relative physical and mental isolation from the
details of flying helps contribute to the safety by
reducing workload and reliance on possible
human variability or failure. On the other hand,
when the automatic equipment fails, the crew's
relative isolation can dramatically increase the
difficulties and the magnitude of the problem
faced in diagnosing the situation and in deter-
mining the appropriate course 0f _ictf6K _ _
Physical isolation would be all right if the
crew were still up-to-date on the critical states
of the device being controlled. The problem is
that, increasingly, the physical isolation is ac-
companied by a form of mentalisolation. Zuboff
(1989) describes the control room of a modem
paper mill: Where once the operators roamed
the floor, smelling, hearing and feeling the
processes, now they are poised above the floor,
isolated in a sound-isolated, air-conditioned,
glass control room. The paper mill operators do
not get the same information about the state of
the mill from their meters and displays as they
did from their physical presence on the floor.
The ship captain does not have a good feel for
the actual problems taking place on the other
side of the ship. And the automatic equipment
in an airplane cockpit can isolate the crew from
the state of the aircraft. It is this mental isolation
that is thought to be largely responsible for
many of the current difficulties.
Detecting System Problems:
Three Case Studies
Here are three case studies from the world of
aviation, a domain chosen because aviation is
the best documented and validated ofallindus-
trial situations.
The Case of the Loss of Engine Power
In 1985, a China Airlines 747 suffered a slow
loss of power from its outer right engine. This
would have caused the plane to yaw to the
right, but the autopilot compensated, until it
finally reached the limit of its compensatory
abilities and could no longer keep the plane
stable. At that point, the crew did not have
enough time to determine the cause of the
problem and to take action: The plane rolled
and went into a vertical dive of 31,500 feet
before it could be recovered. The aircraft was
severely damaged and recovery was much in
doubt (NTSB, 1986; Wiener, 1988).
The Case of the "Incapacitated" Pilot
The second case study is a demonstration that
lack of information and interaction can take
place even in the absence of automation, an
THEPROBLEM OF AUTOMATION 3
important piece of evidence for my argument
that automation per se is not the key issue.
In 1979, a commuter aircraft crashed while
landing at an airport on Cape Cod, Massachu-
setts (USA), killing the captain and seriously
injuring the first officer and six passengers. The
first officer observed that the approach was too
low and commented on this to the captain.
However, the captain did not respond. But the
captain, who was also president of the airline,
and who had just hired the first officer, hardly
ever responded, even though airline regula-
tions require pilots to do so. Moreover, the
captain often flew low. There were obvious
social pressures on the first officer that would
inhibit further action.
What the first officer failed to notice was
that the captain was "incapacitated," possibly
even dead from a heart attack. The US National
Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) described
it this way:
The first officer testified that he made all the
required caUouts except the "no contact"
call and that the captain did not
acknowledge any of his calls. Because the
captain rarely acknowledged calls, even calls
such as one dot low [about 50 ft below the 3 °
glide slope] this lack of response probably
would not have alerted the first officer to
any physiologic incapacitation of the
captain. However, the first officer should
have been concerned by the aircraft's steep
glidepath, the excessive descent rate, and
the high airspeed. (NTSB, 1980)
Before you think this a strange, isolated
instance, consider this. In an attempt to under-
stand this rather peculiar circumstance, the
NTSB noted that United Airlines had earlier
performed a study of simulated pilot incapaci-
tation:
In the United simulator study, when the
captain feigned subtle incapacitation while
flying the aircraft during an approach, 25
percent of the aircraft hit the "ground." The
study also showed a significant reluctance
of the first officer to take control of the
aircraft. It required between 30 sec and 4
rain for the other crew member to recognize
that the captain was incapacitated and to
correct the situation. (NTSB, 1980)
The Case of the Fuel Leak
In the previous two case studies, the crew was
unaware of the developing problems. In this
third case study, the vigilant second officer
noticed one sign of a problem, but failed to
detect another. Here is a quotation from the
accident report filed with the NASA Aviation
Safety Reporting System (Data Report 64441,
dated Feb, 1987). 1
Shortly after level off at 35,000 ft... the
second officer brought to my attention that
he was feeding fuel to all three engines from
the number 2 tank, but was showing a drop
in the number 3 tank. I sent the second
officer to the cabin to check that side from
the window. While he was gone, I noticed
that the wheel was cocked to the right and
told the first officer who was flying the
plane to take the autopilot off and check.
When the autopilot was disengaged, the
aircraft showed a roll tendency confirming
that we actually had an out-of-balance
condition. The second officer returned and
said we were losing a large amount of fuel
with a swirl pattern of fuel running about
midwing to the tip, as well as a vapor pattern
covering the entire portion of the wing from
midwing to the fuselage. At this point we
were about 2000 lbs. out of balance ....
In this example, the second officer (the flight
engineer) provided the valuable feedback that
something seemed wrong with the fuel bal-
ance. The automatic pilot had quietly and effi-
ciently compensated for the resulting weight
imbalance, and had the second officer not noted
the fuel discrepancy, the situation would not
t These are voluntary reports, submitted by the people involved.
4 DONALD A. NORMAN
have been noted until much later, perhaps too
late.
Suppose the automatic pilot could have
signaled the crew that it was starting to com-
pensate the balance more than was usual, or at
the least, more than when the autopilot was
first engaged? This would have alerted the
crew to a potential problem. Technically, this
information was available to the crew, because
the autopilot controls the aircraft by physically
moving the real instruments and controls, in
this situation, by rotating the control wheel to
maintain balance. The slow but consistent turn-
ing of the wheel could have been noted by any
of the three crew members. This is a subtle cue,
however, and it was not noted by either the
pilot or the co-pilot (the first officer) until after
the second officer had reported the fuel unbal-
ance and had left the cockpit.
The Problem Is Not Automation,
It Is Lack of Feedback
Automation is increasingly blamed for prob-
lems in high-risk industry. The general theme
of the argument is that in the "good old days,"
prior to automation, the controllers were ac-
tively engaged in the plant operation. They had
to monitor everything and control everything.
This had problems, in particular, high mental
workloads and overreliance on people's abili-
ties to be continually alert, accurate, and knowl-
edgeable. But it had the virtue of keeping the
operators continually informed as to the state
of the system.
In the language of control theory or servo-
mechanisms, a system has a desired state, a
means for adjusting the system toward that
desired state, and then a feedback loop in which
the actual state of the system is compared with
the desired state, so that additional correction
can be performed if there is a mismatch. The
combination of this control plus feedback is
called the control loop, and when a human is
operating the equipment manually, theh_an
is an essential element of the control loop---
hence the saying, "the person is in the loop."
With the advent of automated controls, the
human's job changed. The automation took
care of the lower level actions and the human
operators simply watched over the system,
presumably ever-alert for deviations and prob-
lems. Now the human operators were manag-
ers or supervisors rather than controllers: they
were "out of the loop" (see the papers in Bain-
bridge, 1987; S. Norman & Orlady, 1989; Ras-
mussen & Rouse, 1981; or Weiner & Currey,
1980).
Automation has clearly improved many
aspects of performance. It leads to superior
productivity, efficiency, and quality control. In
aircraft, fuel efficiency is improved, schedules
can be maintained in inclement weather, and
overall accident rates have gone down. But
automation also leads to difficulties. When
problems arise, the crew may not be sufficiently
up-to-date with the current state of the system
to diagnose the problems in reasonable time,
and the general reliance on automatic systems
may have led to a degradation of manual skills.
Finally, the highest stress and workload occur
at times of trouble. That is, automatic equip-
ment seems to function best when the work-
load is light and the task routine: When the task
requires assistance, when the workload is high-
est, this is when the automatic equipment is of
least assistance---this is the "irony" of automa-
tion (Bainbridge, 1987; see also S. Norman &
Orlady, 1989).
What of the fact that the people are "out of
the loop"? Is this the major culprit? In some of
the case studies in this paper, the crew-was
clearly out of the loop, failing to detect symp-
toms of trouble early enough to do anything
about them. But in one of the studies, the case of
the "incapacitated" pilot, no automation was
involved. Instead, there was an uncommunica-
tive captain, plus social pressures that worked
against a junior first officer interrupting the
activities of a senior captain. In other words,
although the human operators are indeed no
longer "in the loop," the culprit is not automa-
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tion, it is the lack of continual feedback and
interaction.
Two Thought Experiments
Consider two thought experiments. In the first,
imagine a captain of a plane who turns control
over to the autopilot, as in the case studies of the
loss of engine power and the fuel leak. In the
second thought experiment, imagine that the
captain turns control over to the first officer,
who flies the plane "by hand." In both of these
situations, as far as the captain is concerned, the
control has been automated: by an autopilot in
one situation and by the first officer in the other.
But in the first situation, if problems occur, the
autopilot will compensate and the crew will
notice only by chance (as in the case study of the
fuel leak). When automatic devices compen-
sate for problems silently and efficiently, the
crew is "out of the loop," so that when failure of
the compensatory equipment finally occurs,
they are not in any position to respond immedi-
ately and appropriately.
In the case of the second thought experi-
ment where the control was turned over to the
first officer, we would expect the first officer to
be in continual interaction with the captain.
Consider how this would have worked in the
case studies of the loss of engine power or the
fuel leak. In either case, the problem would
almost definitely had been detected much ear-
lier in the flight. The first officer would proba-
bly have said something like "I seem to be
correcting this thing more and more---I wonder
what's happening?" Yes, from the captain's
point of view the rest of the crew serves as a
type of automaton, but one that observes and
remarks upon conditions. By reporting upon
observations and possible discrepancies, each
crew member keeps the rest informed and
alerted--keeping everyone "in the loop."
The observations of these thought experi-
ments are buttressed by the situation described
in the case study of the fuel leak, where the
second officer, routinely scanning the gauges,
noted a puzzling discrepancy and commented
on it to the captain. As the captain's report said,
"the second officer brought to my attention that
he was feeding fuel to all three engines from the
number 2 tank, but was showing a drop in the
number 3 tank. I sent the second officer to the
cabin to check that side from the window."
Here, even though the second officer did not
understand the reason for the discrepant fuel
gauge reading, the voiced observation
prompted the captain to look over the aircraft
by sending the second officer to the cabin to
examine the wing and for himself to check the
cockpit. The cockpit check led the captain to
note that the "wheel was cocked to the right,"
which then led to the discovery of the weight
imbalance caused by a massive fuel leak. At the
time the second officer commented on the fuel
gauge reading, he did not know what the prob-
lem was, but his comment alerted the crew.
Again, this observation makes the point
that the culprit is not actually automation, but
rather the lack of feedback. The informal chat-
ter that normally accompanies an experienced,
socialized crew tends to keep everyone informed
of the complete state of the system, allowing for
the early detection of anomalies. Hutchins (in
press) has shown how this continual verbal
interaction in a system with highly social crews
serves to keep everyone attentive and informed,
helps the continual traIning of new members of
the crew, and serves as a natural monitor for
error.
The Solution? More Appropriate
Automation
The message is that automation, per se, is not
the culprit in high-risk situations. Many of the
current problems are indeed a result of automa-
tion, but only in the sense that the automation
is inappropriately designed and applied.
When people perform actions, feedback is
essential for the appropriate monitoring of those
actions, to allow for the detection and correc-
tion of errors, and to keep alert. This is hardly a
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novel point: Feedback is an essential aspect of We Do Not Know Enough to Mimic Natural
all control theory. But adequate feedback to the Human Interaction
human operators is absent far more than it is
present, whether the system be a computer Note that the problems in all three of the case
operating system, an autopilot, or a telephone
system. In fact, it is rather amazing how such an
essential source o fin formation could be skipped:
The need for complete feedback is one of the
major points of Norman (1988). Without appro-
priate feedback, people are indeed out of the
loop: They may not know if their requests have
been received, if the actions are being per-
formed properly, or if problems are occurring.
Feedback is also essential for learning, both of
tasks and of the way that the system responds
to the wide variety of situations it will
encounter.
People construct mental models of systems
with which they interact. The model is con-
strutted entirely from what I have called "the
system image," the information available to
them from the system, the environment, and
their instructions (Norman, 1986). But this sys-
tem image depends critically upon the infor-
mation displays of modern equipment. When
we send a command to an automated piece of
equipment, the only way we can update our
mental models of the system is through the
feedback provided us.
In the first case study, the China Airlines
situation where the autopilot kept compensat-
ing for the loss of engine power, if the autopilot
had been intelligent enough, it might have
reported the need to keep compensating. In the
case study of the weight imbalance caused by a
studies were not due to a lack of information, at
least not in the technical sense. Autopilots work
by physically moving the same controls that the
pilots use. In the case studies of the loss of
engine power and the fuel leak, the autopilots
compensated by turning the control wheels. In
theory, the crew could have noted the problem
quite early by noting the position of the wheels,
just as the second officer did note an abnormal-
ity in the fuel gauge readings in the fuel leak
case study. Similarly, there was sufficient infor-
mation in the case of pilot incapacitation. In
these cases the problem was that no person or
system commented upon the issues, so that
nothing brought the potential problem to the
attention of the relevant people. The feedback
was potentially available, but it was not at-
tended to properly. 2
The task of presenting feedback in an ap-
propriate way is not easy to do. Indeed, we do
not yet know how to do it. We do have a good
example of how not to inform people of possible
difficulties: overuse of alarms. One of the prob-
lems of modern automation is the unintelligent
use of alarms, each individual instrument hav-
ing a single threshold condition that it uses to
sound a buzzer or flash a message to the opera-
tor, warning of problems. The proliferation of
these alarms and the general unreliability of
these single-threshold events causes much dif-
ficulty (see Patterson, 1989; Sorkin, 1989; and
fuel leak, there were two opportunities to note Sorkin, Kantowitz, & Kantowitz, 1988). What is
the problem. An intelligent automaton could needed is continual feedback about the state of
have reported on the continual increase in
compensation necessary to keep the plane level.
Or it might have noted that the fuel level of the
number 3 tank was falling, even though fuel
was only supposed to be pumped from the
number 2 tank. And in the case of the incapaci-
tated pilot, if the captain and his first officer had
been better socialized and had followed normal
and proper callout and response procedures
with the two considered as equal members of
the operation, the pilot's incapacitation would
have been discovered.
the system, in a normal natural way, much in
2During the writing of this paper, I took part in an informal
replication of the fuel leak incident in the NASA-Ames full-
vision, full-motion 727 simulator. Once again, the secondoffiee_
failed to note the discrepant control wheel position, even though
in this case he had read the relevant accident report"The normal
cockpit activities drew the focus of attention away from the
control wheel position. Our analyses afterwards indicated that
the wheel position was not a very salient clue in any case. We
plan furtherstudies including acarefulreplication of this situation
as well as a formal experimental study of the two "thought
experiments" described in this paper.
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the manner that human participants in a joint
problem-solving activity will discuss the issues
among themselves. This means designing sys-
tems that are informative, yet nonintrusive, so
the interactions are done normally and con-
tinually, where the amount and form of feed-
back adapts to the interactive style of the par-
ticipants and the nature of the problem. We do
not yet know how to do this with automatic
devices. Current attempts tend to irritate as
much as they inform, either failing to present
enough information or presenting so much that
it becomes an irritant--a nagging, "back-seat
driver," second-guessing all actions.
A Higher Order of Awareness Is Needed
To give the appropriate kind of feedback re-
quires a higher level of sophistication in auto-
mation than currently exists. Consider what is
required for an automatic pilot to note that it is
compensating more than normal. The current
automatic systems are feedback loops that at-
tempt to maintain a constant system state. To
provide self-monitoring capability that would
let it recognize that conditions are changing
and more and more compensation is being
used would require a kind of higher-level of
awareness, a monitoring of its own monitoring
abilities.
Now, obviously, it would not be difficult to
build automatic systems for the specific cases of
monitoring for increased rudder or control-
yoke compensation, or for inappropriate fuel
loss: Any competent computer scientist could
write an appropriate program. But what about
the next problem, one that will involve yet a
different system, yet a slightly different anom-
aly? We do not know how to solve the general
condition.
Consider what would be required of a fuel
monitoring system to detect that the fuel level
of tank x was dropping, but that fuel was only
supposed to be fed from tank y. To solve this
problem, in the general case, requires an intelli-
gent system, one that understands the implica-
tions of the various control settings of the sys-
tem. There probably has to be a knowledge base
of the systems in the aircraft plus an internal
representation for the items that would allow
the system to reason about the potential cases.
This is the sort of thing done today in laborato-
ries of artificial intelligence and cognitive sci-
ence, but we do not know how to solve this
problem, for the general case. Moreover, even if
the automatic monitoring equipment were to
note the existence of a system trend or discrep-
ancy that could lead to a difficulty later on, how
should it be brought to the attention of the
operators in a natural, intelligent fashion, much
the way that normal cockpit conversation
works?
The solutions will require higher levels of
automation, some forms of intelligence in the
controls, an appreciation for the proper form of
human communication that keeps people well
informed, on top of the issues, but not annoyed
and irritated. Our current level of knowledge is
not enough to do these things.
The New Irony of Overautomation
Many ills have been laid at the feet of "overau-
tomation." Too much automation takes the
human out of the control loop, it deskills them,
and it lowers morale. One much remarked-
upon irony of automation is that it fails when it
is most needed. I agree with all the analyses of
the problems, but from these analyses, I reach
the opposite conclusion, a different irony: Our
current problems with automation, problems
that tend to be blamed on "overautomation,"
are probably the result of just the opposite
problem--the problem is not that the automa-
tion is too powerful, the problem is that it is not
powerful enough.
Why Don't Current Systems Provide
Feedback?
Why do current systems have such poor
feedback and interaction? In part, the reason is
a lack of sensitivity on the part of the designer,
but in part, it is for a perfectly natural reason:
The automation itself doesn't need it! That is, if
a designer is asked to design an automatic piece
of equipment to control some function, the task
is completed when the device functions as
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requested. Providing feedback and monitoring
information to the human operators is of secon-
dary importance, primarily because there does
not appear to be any need for it.
Feedback is essential because equipment
does fail and because unexpected events do
arise. In fact, in any complex task or environ-
ment, one should always expect unexpected
events: What is unexpected is the type of event
that will occur. Human operators need to cope
with these situations, and this is why the feed-
back and "conversation" is required. Were the
equipment never to fail, were it capable of
handling all possible situations, then the hu-
man operator would not be necessary, so the
feedback and interaction would similarly not
be necessary. Today, in the absence of perfect
automation, an appropriate design should as-
sume the existence of error, it should continu-
ally provide feedback, it should continually
interact with operators in an appropriate man-
ner, and it should have a design appropriate for
the worst of situations. What is needed is a soft,
compliant technology, not a rigid, formal one.
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